Quite interesting, thank you all.
But how do these ideas lead us into the situation explored in the second study? Why does our confirmation bias on a certain isolate matter, increase the tendency to reject the entire field? e.g. (from the article) if science disagrees with you on whether or not homosexuality is correlated with mental illness, then you are less likely to credit science with being able to discuss the effect of television violence on violent behavior, the accuracy of astrology, and the health effects of herbal medications. To extend the hunter-gatherer metaphor this is rather like if a group of people have a long tradition of not eating blue berries (because conventional wisdom says blue berries make you die, everyone knows that) when they encounter a man who does eat blue berries and doesn't die, they are biased against believing him that blue berries are safe. This makes sense. There is a longstanding tradition of not eating blue berries, and so people will look for an excuse not to believe him. However, (unless I am oversimplifying, and I may well be) the second article seems to suggest that if a different fellow comes along later, and eats purple berries (a berry that their communal wisdom is completely silent on) and doesn't die, the are unlikely to believe him as well, because the entire methodology of eating things to see if you will die when you eat them has been thrown into doubt by blue berry man.
And to discuss Jude's comment about the scientific establishment for the moment, we do not seem to lack the first quality: just look at people like Peter Duesberg who despite being brilliant scientists become drooling idiots on specific subjects. We instead tend to lack the second. No matter how much Duesberg doubts the link between HIV and AIDS, no matter how often he invents methodological flaws because he can't accept research, he does not suddenly start doubting all scientific research in the same way the second article suggests that some laymen are prone to.